Problems of the Pacific — Inside the Classic
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Peru was the chief, boasting a gracious but unwarlike civilisation, doomed to utter destruction at the hands of Spain. Now that stretch of Pacific littoral is held by a group of Latin-American nations, the possibilities of which it is difficult accurately to forecast, but which are in some measure formidable if Chili is accepted as a standard by which to judge, though, on the whole, they have shown so far but little capacity for effective national organisation.
Looking westward, Cortes in his day could see nothing but darkness. It was surmised rather than known that there lay the Indies, the kingdoms of the Cham of Tartary and the great Mogul, lands which showed on the horizon of the imagination, half real, half like the fantasy of a mirage. To-day the west coast of the Pacific is held by the European Power of Russia; by the aspiring Asiatic Power of Japan, which within half a century has forgotten the use of the bow and the fan in warfare and hammered its way with modern weapons into the circle of the world's great Powers; by China, stirring uneasily and grasping at the same weapons which won greatness for Japan; by a far-flung advance guard of the great Power of the United States in the Philippines, won accidentally, held grimly; by England's lonely outposts, Australia and New Zealand, where less than five millions of the British race hold a territory almost as large as Europe.
Sprinkled over the surface of the ocean, between East and West, are various fortresses or trading stations, defending interests or arousing cupidities. Germany and France are represented. The United States holds Hawaii, the key to the Pacific coast of North America, either for offence or defence. Great Britain has Fiji and various islets. The Japanese Power stretches down towards the Philippines with the recent acquisition of Formosa.
Here are seen all the great actors in European rivalry. Added to them are the new actors in world-politics, who represent the antagonism of the Yellow Race to the White Race. Before all is dangled the greatest temptation to ambition and cupidity. Who is master of the Pacific, who has the control of its trade, the industrial leadership of its peoples, the disposal of its warrior forces, will be master of the world.
It is a problem not only of navies and armies (though with our present defective civilisation these are the most important factors): it is a problem also of populations and their growth, of industries, of the development of natural resources, of trade and commerce. The Pacific littoral is in part unpeopled, in part undeveloped, unorganised, unappropriated. Its Asiatic portion must change, it is changing, from a position which may be compared with that of Japan fifty years ago to a position such as Japan's to-day. Its American and Australian portion must develop power and wealth surpassing that of Europe. Under whose leadership will the change be made? To discuss that question is the purpose of this book: and at the outset the lines on which the discussion will proceed and the conclusions which seem to be inevitable may be foreshadowed.
At one time Russia seemed destined to the hegemony of the Pacific. Yet she was brought to the Pacific coast by accident rather than by design. Her natural destiny was westward and southward rather than eastward, though it was natural that she should slowly permeate the Siberian region. As far back as the reign of Ivan the Terrible (the Elizabethan epoch in Anglo-Saxon history), the curious celibate military organisation of the Cossacks had won much of Siberia for the Czars. But there was no dream then, nor at a very much later period, of penetration to the Pacific.
European jealousy of Russia, a jealousy which is explainable only with the reflection that vast size naturally fills with awe the human mind, stopped her advance towards the Mediterranean. In the north her ports were useless in winter. In the south she was refused a development of her territory which was to her mind natural and just. Thus thwarted, Russia groped in a blind way from the Siberian provinces which had been won by the Cossacks towards a warm-water port in Asia. At first the movement was southward and filled England with alarm as to the fate of India. Then it turned eastward, and in Manchuria and Corea this European Power seemed to find its destiny. But Japan was able to impose an effective check upon Russian ambitions in the Far East. At the present moment Russia has been supplanted in control of the Asiatic seaboard by Japan.
Frank Fox opens Problems of the Pacific with a sweeping historical analogy: the Mediterranean settled ancient struggles, the Atlantic decided modern supremacy, and now the Pacific will host the next great contest for world dominance. His prose moves from Cortes and Balboa to a catalogue of Pacific nations, mixing geopolitical argument with statistical tables on area, population, and revenue. The authorial voice is confident, declarative, and unapologetically British imperialist, framing the central question as a racial and national competition: 'Shall it go to the White Race or the Yellow Race?'
Diction and the Rhetoric of Inevitability
Fox repeatedly uses the phrase 'ocean of the future' to frame the Pacific as a destined stage. His diction leans on verbs of inevitability: 'will be decided,' 'demands,' 'rushed forward.' The opening chapter builds momentum through a series of contrasts—'Mediterranean sufficed,' 'Atlantic became the test'—that position the Pacific as the logical next arena. This rhetorical pattern, traceable in the excerpts, suggests Fox is less interested in neutral analysis than in persuading his reader that a climactic struggle is imminent. The word 'problem' itself recurs as a structuring device, turning geopolitical complexity into a single, urgent question.
Voice and the Imperial Perspective
Fox writes from an explicitly British imperial standpoint, referring to 'the British Flag' and 'British trade interests' as natural reference points. His treatment of Latin America, for instance, evaluates its potential only in relation to US or British power: he speculates on a 'Latin-American Empire' as a counterbalance, but dismisses it as unlikely because these peoples 'have not yet shown any genius for self-government.' The voice is that of a metropolitan observer judging distant regions by their utility to empire. Even when discussing the United States, Fox measures its actions by their effect on British commerce, noting that a US preferential tariff would be 'a very serious detriment to British trade interests.'
Structure: The Catalogue as Argument
The excerpts reveal a distinctive structural habit: Fox builds his case through enumerated lists and statistical tables. In the Latin America section, he itemises republics with area, population, and revenue figures, then uses those numbers to support a policy argument. This catalogue style appears throughout the table of contents—'The Navies of the Pacific,' 'The Armies of the Pacific,' 'Treaties in the Pacific'—suggesting the book organises its argument by inventorying national capabilities. The effect is to make geopolitical analysis seem empirical and objective, even as Fox's selection and framing of data serve his imperial thesis.
Recurring Details: The Panama Canal and Trade Figures
Fox repeatedly returns to the Panama Canal as a pivot point. He calculates its effect on British trade with specific Latin American countries, naming Peru and Chile as vulnerable to 'New York competition.' The precision of these trade figures—£16,426,000 from Brazil, £19,097,000 from Argentina—anchors his broader argument in concrete detail. This recurring attention to commercial statistics reveals Fox's underlying assumption that economic influence precedes political control. The canal is not just a geographical fact but a strategic variable that will 'strengthen American influence' or leave British communications 'unchanged.' Such details give the book a documentary texture, even when its predictions remain speculative.
Fox's book is best read as a primary document of pre-World War I imperial thought, not as a predictive work. His confidence in racial categories and great-power competition reflects the assumptions of 1912, while his statistical tables and historical analogies offer a period-specific method of argument. Readers interested in the rhetoric of empire or the intellectual history of geopolitics will find the authorial choices in diction, voice, and structure as revealing as the ostensible subject.
That rainy afternoon, Fox’s tallying of empires felt less like history than weather—each rival claim a grey wave. I closed it and drifted to a shelf, landing on Old Taverns of New York — Background and Themes. Strange, but the same tug: places where power gathered, argued, and left their stains in the wood.
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