The Bullitt Mission to Russia Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, of William C. Bullitt — Key Ideas to Explore

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Bullitt, William C. (William Christian), 1891-1967 Project Gutenberg 2004 Not confirmed
Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920). Russia; United States -- Foreign relations -- Soviet Union; Soviet Union -- Foreign relations -- United States Readers of public-domain and historical texts
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Words 43,856
Reading time 191 min
Text sections 5

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William C. Bullitt's 1919 Senate testimony on his secret mission to Soviet Russia, revealing the Allied peace proposal, Lenin's conditions, and the suppression of his report amid the Paris Peace Conference.
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Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos, the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. Lloyd George. No; that is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should be brought to Paris.

COUNCIL OF TEN DISCUSSES RUSSIA

NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA.

Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as follows:

Firstly, the real facts are not known;

Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question; and

Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact, there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies:

1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one can conceive or understand to bring about order by force.

2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized what this would mean. From the information furnished him Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the Allies desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider.

The Bullitt Mission to Russia is structured as a transcript of William C. Bullitt's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 1919. The text alternates between direct Q&A with senators and appended documents—Bullitt's official report, proposed peace terms, and supplementary accounts from Lincoln Steffens and Captain Pettit. This layered format lets readers track how evidence was presented, challenged, and sometimes withheld.

A recurring structural feature is the movement between firsthand observation and diplomatic negotiation. Bullitt describes traveling from Paris to Petrograd, meeting Lenin, and then returning to find his report suppressed. The testimony itself becomes a stage where the failure of the Prinkipos conference and the rejection of the Allied peace proposal are reenacted through questioning.

The Testimony as a Documentary Form

The book's primary text is a Senate hearing transcript, preserving the rhythm of interrogation. Senator Lodge opens by establishing Bullitt's credentials—his pre-war journalism, his role at the Paris Peace Conference—before probing the mission's origins. The committee's questions often circle back to the same point: why was Bullitt's report suppressed? This repetition creates a sense of bureaucratic obstruction.

Interspersed are documents like the ten-point armistice proposal, which lists conditions such as territorial control, free entry, and amnesty. The appendix includes reports on transport, food, and social conditions, shifting the focus from high politics to ground-level logistics. Readers must navigate between the spoken testimony and these written artifacts, each offering a different angle on the same events.

Recurring Images of Movement and Blockade

Throughout the testimony, images of movement—or its absence—recur. Bullitt describes traveling through Germany, Austria, and Poland before the war, then later being summoned from the woods to testify. The peace proposal itself hinges on lifting blockades and restoring trade routes. Phrases like "free entry, sojourn, circulation" and "simultaneous reduction of armed forces" emphasize a desire to break stasis.

Yet the text also records immobility: the Allied troops stuck at Archangel, the Prinkipos conference that never happened, Bullitt's report buried in committee. The contrast between intended motion and actual paralysis becomes a structural tension. Even the hearing's setting—Room 310 of the Senate Office Building—grounds the discussion in a fixed, institutional space, while the subject matter ranges across continents.

The Suppressed Report and Its Aftermath

A central thread is the fate of Bullitt's report. He testifies that it was submitted to President Wilson and Secretary Lansing but never officially presented to the peace conference. The committee presses him on whether Lloyd George deceived Parliament about the proposal. Bullitt's answers are measured, but the appended documents—including a memorandum from Auchincloss and the Nansen plan—suggest a pattern of delay and denial.

The report itself, reproduced in full, covers economic conditions, social conditions, and Lenin's prestige. Bullitt concludes that the Soviet government was stable and willing to compromise. The subsequent rejection of peace, attributed to Kolchak's advance, marks a turning point. The testimony thus becomes a postmortem for a diplomatic opportunity that was allowed to lapse.

Witnesses Beyond Bullitt: Steffens and Pettit

The appendix includes two additional reports: Lincoln Steffens on his own conversations in Russia, and Captain W.W. Pettit on social work in Petrograd. These voices broaden the evidentiary base beyond Bullitt's alone. Steffens, known as a muckraker, offers a journalist's perspective on the Bolshevik leadership. Pettit provides granular detail on food distribution and orphanages.

Their inclusion underscores the committee's attempt to gather multiple accounts, yet the hearing never calls them to testify. The reader is left to weigh these written statements against Bullitt's oral testimony. This polyvocal structure mirrors the larger question of how to verify information from a closed society—a problem that remains central to the book's documentary value.

Readers should approach this text as a primary source that captures a specific moment in U.S.-Soviet relations. The transcript format rewards attention to what is said, what is omitted, and how documents are deployed. Comparing Bullitt's report with the appended materials reveals the gaps between intelligence gathered and policy enacted. The book is less a narrative than an archive of a failed negotiation, preserved in the record of a Senate hearing.

I've often thought about Bullitt's silenced report, that testimony buried while history took its own crooked path. It reminds me of another pair of voices, the James brothers, whose outlaw lives were rewritten into legend. Both stories speak of truth set aside for a more comfortable tale. Life and adventures of Frank and Jesse James, the noted western outlaws — Text and Context holds that same quiet ache of a story waiting, patient, on the shelf.

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