The Communist Threat in the Taiwan Area — Background and Themes

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In Category - Modern Nations

Authors: Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969, Dulles, John Foster, 1888-1959 Digital Source: Project Gutenberg Gutenberg Release Year: 2005 First Publication Year: Not confirmed

Key Word: United States -- Foreign relations -- China; China -- Foreign relations -- United States; Taiwan -- Defenses Target Reader: Readers of public-domain and historical texts

Book Edition: Project Gutenberg digital edition Book Language: en

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Reading time 35 min

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Source: Project Gutenberg record #16142

A 1958 U.S. government publication compiling official statements by Secretary Dulles, President Eisenhower, and their correspondence with Khrushchev during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, arguing against Chinese Communist military actions and asserting treaty obligations to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands.

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Consideration was given to measures which would conform to the policy enunciated on September 4 by the Secretary of State on the authority of the President. But particular note was taken of the reported radio statement of Mr. Chou En-lai indicating that the Chinese Communists were prepared to resume ambassadorial talks with the United States "in order to contribute further to the safeguarding of peace." These talks, which had been conducted in Europe for several years, were recently interrupted by the Chinese Communists.

So far the United States has not received any official word on this subject. We hope, however, that the reported statement of Mr. Chou En-lai is responsive to the urging, contained in our September 4 policy statement, that "armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions," although such renunciation of force need not involve renouncing claims or the pursuit of policies by peaceful means. This is the course that the United States will resolutely pursue, in conforming with our vital interests, our treaty obligations, and the principles on which world order is based.

The United States has sought to implement that policy in its past talks at the ambassadorial level with the Chinese Communists. On July 28, 1958, and subsequently, we have sought a resumption of these talks.

If the Chinese Communists are now prepared to respond, the United States welcomes that decision. The United States Ambassador at Warsaw stands ready promptly to meet with the Chinese Communist Ambassador there, who has previously acted in this matter.

Naturally, in these resumed talks the United States will adhere to the negotiating position which it originally took in 1955, namely, that we will not in these talks be a party to any arrangement which would prejudice the rights of our ally, the Republic of China.

3. President Eisenhower's Report to the American People,

MY FRIENDS: Tonight I want to talk to you about the situation, dangerous to peace, which has developed in the Formosa Straits in the Far East. My purpose is to give you its basic facts and then my conclusions as to our Nation's proper course of action.

To begin, let us remember that traditionally this country and its Government have always been passionately devoted to peace with honor, as they are now. We shall never resort to force in settlement of differences except when compelled to do so to defend against aggression and to protect our vital interests.

This means that, in our view, negotiations and conciliation should never be abandoned in favor of force and strife. While we shall never timidly retreat before the threat of armed aggression, we would welcome in the present circumstances negotiations that could have a fruitful result in preserving the peace of the Formosa area and reaching a solution that could be acceptable to all parties concerned including, of course, our ally, the Republic of China.

On the morning of August 23d the Chinese Communists opened a severe bombardment of Quemoy, an island in the Formosa Straits off the China Coast. Another island in the same area, Matsu, was also attacked. These two islands have always been a part of Free China--never under Communist control.

This bombardment of Quemoy has been going on almost continuously ever since. Also, Chinese Communists have been using their naval craft to try to break up the supplying of Quemoy with its 125,000 people. Their normal source of supply is by sea from Formosa, where the Government of Free China is now located.

Chinese Communists say that they will capture Quemoy. So far they have not actually attempted a landing, but their bombardment has caused great damage. Over 1,000 people have been killed or wounded. In large part these are civilians.

This is a tragic affair. It is shocking that in this day and age naked force should be used for such aggressive purposes.

But this is not the first time that the Chinese Communists have acted in this way.

In 1950 they attacked and tried to conquer the Republic of Korea. At that time President Truman announced the intention of protecting Formosa, the principal area still held by Free China, because of the belief that Formosa's safety was vital to the security of the United States and the free world. Our Government has adhered firmly ever since 1950 to that policy.

In 1953 and 1954 the Chinese Communists took an active part in the war in Indochina against Viet-Nam.

In the fall of 1954 they attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the same two islands they are attacking now. They broke off that attack when, in January 1955, the Congress and I agreed that we should firmly support Free China.

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The volume opens with Secretary Dulles's September 4, 1958 statement, which immediately establishes a legal and diplomatic framework: it cites the 1954 mutual defense treaty, a joint resolution of Congress, and a 13-year period of continuous Free China administration over Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu. The language is precise and numbered, listing six points that define the U.S. position. Dulles describes the Chinese Communist bombardment as a 'crude violation' of world order principles, yet he also leaves room for ambiguity, noting that it is 'not yet certain' whether the Communists intend an all-out conquest. This careful hedging—asserting threat while avoiding definitive claims of intent—characterizes the rhetorical strategy throughout the collection.

The Structure of Official Persuasion

The document is a composite of four distinct texts: Dulles's statement, a White House statement, Eisenhower's radio address, and his letter to Khrushchev. Each employs a different register. Dulles's numbered points resemble a legal brief. The White House statement is terse and procedural. Eisenhower's address shifts to a conversational tone, using phrases like 'My friends' and 'we devoutly hope.' The letter to Khrushchev adopts diplomatic formality. This layered structure allows the same core argument—that Chinese Communist aggression threatens peace—to be repeated in varied voices, reinforcing the message without appearing redundant. Readers should note how each section repackages the same factual claims (the bombardment, the 125,000 civilians on Quemoy, the rejection of UN jurisdiction) for different audiences: allies, the American public, and the Soviet leader.

Recurring Legal and Historical Claims

Three assertions recur across the texts. First, the claim that Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu 'have never been under the authority of the Chinese Communists'—a phrasing that treats the Communist government as illegitimate and the Republic of China as the sole legitimate authority. Second, the insistence that the U.S. is bound 'by treaty' and 'by joint resolution of the Congress' to defend these positions, grounding policy in both international and domestic law. Third, the characterization of Chinese Communist actions as part of a pattern: the text links the Taiwan Strait crisis to the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict, arguing that the Communists have consistently labeled their attacks 'civil war' to evade UN jurisdiction. These repeated points create a cumulative argument that the crisis is not isolated but part of a global Communist strategy.

The Rhetoric of Restraint and Openness

Despite the strong language, the texts repeatedly emphasize restraint and diplomatic openness. Dulles states that the U.S. 'will not be a party to any arrangements which would prejudice rights of our ally,' but he also welcomes the prospect of resumed ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev agrees that 'a dangerous situation exists' but disputes the source of danger, then pivots to propose negotiations. The president's radio address explicitly says 'there is not going to be any war' and calls for a 'peaceful solution.' This dual message—firmness on principles, willingness to negotiate—is a deliberate rhetorical balance. Readers should observe how the texts manage tension: they assert the possibility of diplomacy while simultaneously preparing the public for prolonged confrontation, as in Eisenhower's closing warning that 'this has not been the first test for us and for the free world. Probably it will not be the last.'

Audience and the Absent Voices

The collection is a U.S. government publication, and its intended audience is primarily domestic and allied. The Chinese Communist position is presented only through paraphrased radio broadcasts and rejected claims. The Republic of China appears as an ally whose rights must be protected, but its own statements are not included. Khrushchev's letter is referenced but not reproduced in full. This asymmetry means the reader encounters only one side of the debate. The texts also assume a reader familiar with Cold War geography and recent history: the significance of Quemoy and Matsu, the 1955 UN Security Council episode, and the parallel to Korea and Vietnam are mentioned without explanation. For a first-time reader, the excerpts provide a concentrated example of how the U.S. executive branch framed a regional crisis in legal, historical, and moral terms, while leaving the opposing viewpoint largely inferred.

Reading these excerpts in sequence reveals how a single policy position can be adapted across different genres—from numbered statement to presidential address to diplomatic letter. The texts are not neutral records but active instruments of persuasion, designed to justify military commitment while preserving room for negotiation. Readers should pay attention to the precise wording of legal claims and the careful modulation of tone, as these choices reflect the strategic communication of a superpower during a Cold War flashpoint.

That rainy afternoon, I sat with the 1958 Dulles–Eisenhower papers on the Taiwan Strait, struck less by the missiles than by the sheer paperwork of empire—the careful cables, the official denials. Closing it, my hand drifted to the shelf and pulled down The Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Company Including that of the French Traders of North-Western Canada and of the North-West, XY, and Astor Fur Companies — Context and Discussion. Different century, same quiet arithmetic of territory.